05/10/2002
Setiap tanggal 27 Rajab saban tahun, umat Islam memperingati salah satu kisah besar dalam sejarah nabi: Israk Mikraj. Sebagai sebuah kisah agama yang simbolik -- sejajar dengan kisah Adam memakan buah 'kekekalan', perahu keselamatan Nuh, pelayaran Musa kecil, dan 'penyaliban' Isa -- Israk Mikraj juga memiliki makna penting dalam ruang imajinasi umat Islam.
Makna penting itu jika diurai tentu akan memanjang. Israk Mikraj, bisa dimaknai dari sudut pergolakan dakwah nabi, kebenaran doktrin Islam, perjumpaan dengan para nabi lain dan lain sebagainya. Tapi yang jelas, kisah-kisah serupa itu mengarahkan pengetahuan dan kesadaran umat beragama akan narasi besar yang memperkukuh dinamika umat untuk menyaksikan kehadiran Yang Mutlak (Allah). Ini penting, setidaknya demi membendung tergelincirnya sejarah ketuhanan dan agama dari sekadar sejarah dunia yang biasa dan profan (Arkoun, 1996).
Pemahaman seperti yang dikemukakan Arkoun di atas, untuk sebuah momen bersejarah dalam agama, sangat penting dan selalu menemukan signifikansinya. Paling tidak, agama selalu membutuhkan legitimasi tertinggi untuk memperkukuh sisi kebenarannya (truth claim), dan itu terkadang melampaui rasio. Untuk menangkap spirit itu, kesadaran kita digiring untuk melampaui simbol-simbol. Artinya, terkadang kita dituntut untuk melampaui konsep-konsep yang selalu membedakan antara realitas dengan imajinasi, benar dengan salah, sejarah dengan mitos, yang natural dan supernatural. Kisah-kisah simbolik seperti Israk Mikraj terkadang lebih perlu ditangkap sebagai pesan yang mengandung misteri-misteri yang pantas diuraikan hikmah-hikmahnya saja, ketimbang menggali fakta sejarahnya. Dalam rangka itu, kita ingin mengemukakan beberapa hikmah yang mungkin dapat dipetik dari kisah Israk Mikraj yang selalu kita rayakan itu.
Tahun Duka Cita
Kita tahu, secara historis Israk Mikraj (tahun ke-10 kenabian) didahului sebuah tragedi penting: mangkatnya Khadijah (isteri Nabi) dan Abi Thalib (paman). Hilangnya kedua figur yang sedari awal menjadi tulang punggung dakwah itu memiliki implikasi besar bagi suasana psikis nabi. Sejalan dengan itu, kaum Quraisy gencar meningkatkan tekanan-tekanan psikis, ekonomis, dan politis mereka atas nabi dan pengikut-pengikut awalnya. Pahitnya boikot terhadap kebutuhan pangan dan komunikasi, dirasakan nabi dan para sahabat selama kurang lebih dua tahun. Dalam caratan sejarah, tahun-tahun menjelang peristiwa Israk Mikraj itu, akhirnya diberinama 'tahun duka cita' ('am al-huzn).
Dalam kondisi kesejarahan demikianlah skenario Allah berjalan. Nabi diperjalankan (isra') dan dinaikkan (mi'raj) menuju ke haribaan-Nya. Soal apakah peristiwa itu berlangsung secara pisik saja, atau pisik dan psikis sekaligus, ramai diperdebatkan sejarawan Islam. Namun, polemik itu bukan bagian bahasan kita. Sebagaimana galib terdengar, perjalanan Israk Mikraj, mempunyai misi menjemput kewajiban salat. Proses negosiasi perihal salat ini, dibahas panjang lebar oleh Ibnu Hisyam dalam kitab Al-Sirah Al-Nabawiyyah. Namun sebatas yang kita cermati, makna Israk Mikraj lebih dari itu. Israk dan Mikraj merupakan sebuah 'wisata spiritual' yang melampaui batas-batas material-formal kesejarahan.
Bahwa pencapaian spiritualitas selalu menggunakan prosesi-prosesi simbolik (pembedahan dada, transportasi burak, guiding Jibril, perjumpaan dengan nabi-nabi lain), tidak ingin kita diskusikan di sini. Titik penting yang ingin kita capai adalah, bahwa setiap manusia membutuhkan spiritualitas yang terkadang justeru melampaui simbol-simbol. Itulah yang kita teladani dari sampel kisah nabi kali ini. Memang, pencapaian spiritualitas dalam pembahasan sosiologi agama, selalu menggunakan simbol-simbol yang disakralkan. Misalnya, kita menyaksikan orang Yahudi merengek dan membentur-benturkan jidatnya ke tembok ratapan; orang Katolik atau Protestan melakukan kebaktian dengan pujaan-pujaan dalam syair yang indah-indah; umat Islam bertandang ke Mekkah mengitari Ka'bah yang berbentuk kubus.
Yang hendak kita tekankan di sini bukanlah simbol-simbol atau ritual-ritual itu sendiri. Penekanan yang berlebihan pada simbol-simbol terkadang malah berakibat celaka, bahkan bisa berpretensi syirik. Orang yang berumrah dan haji saban tahun, tidak serta merta memastikan capaian spiritualitas yang hakiki. Adakalanya simbol-simbol malah menipu dan memalingkan manusia dari esensi spiritualitas sebenarnya: ketundukan (islam) kepada yang Maha Sakral (Allah). Dari poin ini, kita kemudian dapat memahami penegasan nabi, bahwa tidak ada sistim klerikal dalam Islam. Dalam hal spiritualitas, manusia sangat otonom. Otonomi untuk capaian spiritualitas itu, pada gilirannya menjelma menjadi kebutuhan dan unsur penting kesetimbangan hidup (al-tawazun). Hasilnya, capaian spiritualitas itu nantinya menjelma dalam apa yang dikenal dengan 'kebaikan yang melampaui'. Ini sejalan dengan kredo sufistik yang berbunyi: "Kebaikan menurut standar orang biasa, merupakan keburukan bagi mereka yang mendekatkan dirinya kepada-Nya".
Kita menyadari, banyak problem-problem hidup yang dipersepsi dapat ditanggulangi dengan pendekatan objektif (hukum, ekonomi, sosial, politik dan budaya), ternyata malah mengecewakan dan membuat hidup hampa makna. Dalam kehampaan inilah, momentum Israk Mikraj sebagai wisata spiritual diharapkan dapat memberi perspektif lain dalam penyelesaian problem-problem keduniaan dan kemanusiaan. Persis sama, Israk Mikraj didahului tahun-tahun duka cita yang mengganggu nabi secara psikis. Wisata spiritual Israk Mikraj ingin menegaskan, bahwa kekuatan, ketabahan, harapan dan tantangan, sedikit banyak dapat ditanggulangi oleh peningkatan spiritualitas. Sekilas bahasan kita berkesan terlalu simbolik. Tapi dalam kasus nabi, Israk Mikraj terbukti menggairahkan, menunjang motivasi, dan lebih dari itu, menumbuhkan perasaan bahwa Tuhan berdekatan dengan hamba-Nya sebagaimana yang diwartakan-Nya dalam al-Qur'an. Dari sinilah munculnya harapan.
Beberapa Butir Hikmah
Kita berharap, kondisi objektif bangsa kita yang tidak menentu dewasa ini, mengingatkan akan makna penting di sebalik kisah Israk Mikraj itu. Kalau boleh memberi istilah, kita tidak ragu menyebut tahun-tahun yang kita hadapi belakangan ini sebagai 'tahun-tahun duka cita'. Kita tahu, banyak kemajuan-kemajuan dalam materi hukum dan perundang-undangan, tapi lebih banyak lagi pejabat yang justeru tambah lihai berlindung di balik hukum dan perundang-undangan itu. Kita sama-sama mendengar jeritan TKI yang mengais rejeki di negeri Jiran, sehingga terkesan bahwa negeri kita amat miskin. Tapi ironisnya, media massa memberitahu kita nominal ongkos perjalanan pejabat yang bermilyar-milyar. Kita berharap, moralitas dapat kita bangun demi bangsa, tapi justeru kebocoran anggaran di departemen-departemen 'suaka moral' yang menyayat hati kita.
Akhirnya, kita kehilangan harapan atas sistim dan perangkat hukum yang kita ciptakan. Kita protes, menuntut kesalehan personal dan sosial meningkat untuk menjadi 'perahu Nuh' yang akan mengangkut kita ke puncak keselamatan. Akhirnya kita perlu memeriksa dan mempertanyakan capaian spiritualitas yang kita banggakan sebagai ciri khas Dunia Timur.
Dalam refleksi makna Israk Mikraj kali ini, kita ingin menyarikan beberapa hikmah yang dapat dipetik dari momen-momen simbolik peristiwa itu:
Satu, kita menemukan, bahwa sejarah mencatat prosesi pembedahan dada nabi sewaktu Israk Mikraj. Dari peristiwa itu, kita menangkap simbol pelapangan dada, penyucian hati, penajaman nurani. Lebih spesifik lagi, pembedahan itu beresensi persiapan untuk bermunajat dengan yang Maha Tinggi dan Maha Suci (al-Musayyar, 2001). Dalam realitas kita sekarang, prinsip berlapang dada, mau mengalah, menggunakan nurani dalam relasi-relasi dengan masyarakat dan kekuasaan seolah lenyap. Banyak orang tidak bersedia melampaui batas-batas formal aturan yang diciptakan manusia. Sebagian pejabat yang cacat moral, tidak legowo mengundurkan diri dan melampaui batasan-batasan formal hukum dan konstalasi politik yang menggunakan logika kekuatan. Kebenaran bukan lagi menjadi prinsip, tapi sudah sangat terdistorsi oleh prosedur-prosedur formal. Kebenaran menjadi sangat formal-prosedural.
Dua, kelapangan dada, kerendahan hati dan ketajaman nurani sebagaimana yang dipraktekkan nabi, terlihat sangat penting dalam misi-misi profetik dan sosial demi mereformasi tatanan yang tidak ideal. Fungsinya, sebagaimana yang ditegaskan al-Qur'an, dapat meringankan beban (psikis), mengangkat citra, dan menumbuhkan optimisme, bahwa di balik kesengsaraan ada jalan keluar (QS. Al-Insyirâh: 1-6). Kita menyaksikan, proses reformasi berdampak menyembulnya sikap-sikap negatif yang skeptis, apatis dan pesimis. Momentum Israk Mikraj ini, seyogyanya menjadi inspirasi bagi tumbuhnya sikap-sikap yang positif, demi keberlangsungan reformasi yang kita harapkan.
Tiga, Israk Mikraj juga mengandaikan adanya dorongan untuk belajar dari pengalaman orang lain. Perjumpaan dan dialog antara nabi Muhammad dengan nabi-nabi seniornya, soal-jawabnya kepada Jibril, menandakan bahwa reformasi menuntut kerendahan hati untuk belajar dari banyak kisah gagal dan sukses orang lain. Pengalaman itu sangat bermanfaat bagi nabi sebagai pengemban misi profetik yang penutup. Untuk konteks kita, pengalaman orang lain dapat diajadikan inspirasi bagi penyelesaian problem-problem kebangsaan yang kita hadapi. Dari sini kita juga dapat memahami anjuran al-Qur'an untuk mengambil pelajaran ('ibrah) dari sejarah.
Empat, sebatas yang kita amati, spiritualitas atau perasaan bahwa adanya kontrol yang Maha Tahu atas aktivitas kita, menjadi penting tatkala sistim-sistim yang kita reformasi tidak berjalan dengan ruh yang kita idealkan. Wisata spiritual nabi dalam Israk Mikraj, menunjukkan bahwa spiritualitas sangat penting untuk menuntaskan misi dan visi reformasi. Akhir kalam, sebuah falsafah moralitas mengingatkan kita, bahwa innama al-umam al-akhlaq ma baqiyat, fain hum dzahabat akhlaquhum dzahaba (suatu komunitas akan kekal bersama moralitas; bila moralitasnya hancur, raiblah mereka bersamanya).
[Novriantoni]
Thursday, September 22, 2005
Islam dan Kebebasan Berekspresi
08/09/2002
Suatu ketika, di sebuah apotik di kota Kairo, sekonyong-konyong seorang laki-laki bertanya kepada Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, pemikir Islam dari Mesir yang dituduh murtad karena pemikirannya tentang Alqur’an, “Bukankah Anda bernama Nasr?.” “Ya,” jawab pemikir Islam yang bertubuh gemuk itu. “Apakah Anda orang yang disebut-sebut murtad itu?” kata laki-laki itu memburu. Dengan heran, Nasr balik bertanya: “Anda percaya?” Hm, rupanya kabar burung sampai ke telinga lelaki itu, kalau pakar ilmu Alqur’an itu melecehkan Alqur’an. Lantas, Nasr bertanya lagi, “Pernahkah Anda membaca salah satu buku karanganku?” Dengan jujur, pria itu menjawab, “Sungguh, belum sama sekali!” Pada akhirnya, Nasr memberi wejangan untuk penuduh yang belum membaca bukunya itu: “Aku harap, Engkau mau membacanya. Selanjutnya, berserah dirilah pada Allah!” (Al-Hurriyyah fî Sabîl-i-Allâh, 1994)
Kasus lain lagi. Kabar teranyar dari Mesir mengungkapkan, seorang dai muda kondang selevel Aa’ Gim, bernama Amr Khalid, dilarang pemerintah melanjutkan aktivitas dakwahnya. Tanpa alasan yang kuat, kemungkinan menyangkut masalah kepantasan politik (al-mulâamah al-siyâsiyyah), Amr terpaksa rehat dari tugas amar makruf nahi munkar. Sebagai catatan, sampai kini, pemerintah Mesir masih memberlakukan undang-undang darurat (qânûn al-thawâri’) yang mirip undang-undang subversif a la ORBA. Di belahan dunia lain, tapatnya di Libia, sebuah masjid “disucikan” dari golongan zindiq karena desas-desus mengajarkan “aliran sesat”. Massa beramai-ramai mendatangi mereka agar pensiun dari pengajian dengan rupa-rupa ancaman. Kedua hikayah ini disesalkan secara mendalam oleh pemikir moderat Islam, Fahmi Huwaidi dalam kolomnya setiap Senin di harian Asharq Alawsat (29/7/2002).
Peristiwa di atas memang tidak terjadi di Indonesia. Tapi tentu hal semacam itu bisa terjadi di mana-mana, termasuk di Indonesia. Kita masih ingat, bagaimana kasus sweeping “buku kiri”, pendudukan media massa, dan banyak kasus lain, masih menyiratkan trauma untuk hal kebebasan berekspresi. Sebuah negara yang memiliki perangkat perundang-undangan kebebasan berekspresi yang lemah, akan lebih rawan mengalami kejadian serupa. Sekilas terlihat, kasus Nasr Hamid, Amr Khalid, masjid di Libia, sweeping “buku kiri” dan pendudukan media, berdiri sendiri-sendiri dan tampak berbeda. Tapi sebetulnya, semua itu termasuk antrian problem serius dunia Islam: kebebasan berekspresi masih payah. Salah satu tugas penting dan mendesak kemudian, bagaimana kebebasan berekspresi dijamin baik oleh undang-undang maupun masyarakat yang lama terkekang.
Teror Penguasa dan Teror Massa Paling tidak, ada dua bentuk teror yang dapat ditangkap dari contoh-contoh di atas. Pada kasus Amr, pengekangan kebebasan dipertontonkan penguasa politik secara berlebihan. Itu belum seberapa. Beberapa waktu lalu, pemerintah Mesir juga memenjarakan beberapa akademisi yang disinyalir kuat sebagai aktivis Ikhwanul Muslimin. Alasannya, bukan karena mereka melakukan teror dan tindakan destruktif lainnya, tapi lebih karena mereka kritis. Penangkapan semena-mena oleh rezim penguasa di dunia Islam, tentu tidak sekali dua kita dengar. Cerita yang sama sudah jamak kita dengar dan mengakumulasi menjadi krisis kebebasan yang memasung, bahkan ragam-ragam potensi umat.
Dalam kasus kedua, masyarakat yang tidak terbiasa dengan kebebasan, mempertontonkan suasana prasangka dan ketakutan yang berlebihan. Mereka terpaksa menjadi “masyarakat ternak”. Akibatnya, mereka yang sudah lama tidak menikmati kebebasan itu, tanpa sadar membuat kerangkeng kebebasan bagi diri mereka lagi. Fenomena seperti ini disoroti tajam oleh pemikir liberal bernama Salamah Musa. Menurutnya, selain pemerintah yang phobia kebebasan, masyarakat juga tak jarang berperan besar memasung kebebasan. Dalam banyak kasus, massa lebih cepat bertindak dan menghajar mereka yang keluar dari kebiasaan --baik agama, maupun bukan agama-- mereka. Sementara itu, pemerintah berpangku tangan seolah memberkati “inisiatif” masyarakat itu. (Hurriyyat al-Fikr wa Ibhtâluhâ fi al-Târîkh, 1975)
Kasus teror oleh kekuasaan, boleh jadi bisa diobati dengan proses demokratisasi dan perundang-undangan yang menjamin kebebasan. Ini setidaknya dapat pembenarannya dari negara-negara muslim yang beranjak ke arah demokratisasi. Namun, teror pemikiran/mental/fisik (al-irhâb al-fikrî/al-maknâwî/al-jasadî) yang dilakukan masyarakat, obatnya jauh lebih sulit. Teror pemikiran yang dilakukan massa tertentu, taruhlah gerakan keagamaan yang ekstrim, berdiri di atas tingkat budaya pemikiran dan fanatisme lama yang mendarahdaging di masyarakat. Dalam hal seperti ini, perundang-undangan tidak mampu menawarkan obat, sekiranya tidak didukung/diperkuat opini publik yang prokebebasan, toleransi dan pluralisme. Lebih dari itu, masyarakat perlu mendapat pendidikan tentang bagaimana menikmati kebebasan seraya taat pada hukum. Kondisi kebebasan yang terjamin dan ideal ini tampaknya masih jauh panggang dari api di dunia Islam. Maka, pantas bila Thomas Friedman dalam komentarnya tentang vonis pengadilan yang memenangkan kasus pengajaran ilmu Alqur’an di North Carolina University belakangan ini, menyindir soal kebebasan umat Islam dengan sinis: “Bagaimana reaksi Bin Ladin, sekiranya Bibel diajarkan di salah satu perguruan tinggi Islam?” Masing-masing kita, mungkin tahu jawabnya.
Mahalnya Kebebasan Dari pemandangan di atas, terasa betapa mahal harga kebebasan berekspresi di dunia Islam. Jika kita yakin bahwa agama berperan sentral dalam pembentukan watak bangsa, mau tidak mau kita mesti menagih garansi kebebasan dari agama itu sendiri. Ya, garansi kebebasan berekspresi harus dicarikan dari doktrin terdalam agama. Perlu diakui, bahwa tema kebebasan berekspresi termasuk tema “yang tak terpikirkan” dalam pembahasan pemikiran keislaman. Sama halnya dengan tema demokrasi, HAM, interreligious dialogue, pluralisme, dan tema-tema yang menjadi kebutuhan kontemporer, kebebasan berekspresi menjadi tema yang terabaikan dan tidak terlihat penting dalam kajian-kajian keislaman.
Rasanya perlu dicatat, berbagai perdebatan pemikiran yang berkembang di kalangan umat Islam, semacam wacana apakah Alquran itu makhluk atau bukan, tidak dirayakan sebagai wacana yang dengan santainya dapat berseliweran di muka publik. Karena sesak oleh perdebatan, wacana-wacana yang multitafsir itu, dicarikan kata putusnya dari kekuasaan politik maupun kekerasan massa. Tragedi Ibnu Hanbal dapat menjadi sampel lama untuk masalah ini.
Fenomena menyedihkan ini disesalkan dengan baik oleh Ahmad Al-Baghdadi, seorang pemikir kritis dari Kuwait. Menurutnya, kebebasan berekspresi adalah bagian kebebasan yang tidak dinikmati, kecuali sedikit dalam sejarah negara Islam. Wacana publik tidak jarang berakhir dengan darah saat kekuasaan melakukan intervensi. Al-Baghdadi menilai, dialog bukan keutamaan (fadlâil) umat Islam, meskipun kita mengantongi firman Allah, “…Sanggahlah mereka dengan (argumen/sikap) yang baik. Sesungguhnya, hanya Tuhanmulah yang Mahatahu siapa yang menyimpang dari jalan-Nya dan Dia Mahatahu mereka-mereka yang terbimbing.” (Tajdîd al-Firk al-Dînî: Da‘wat li al-Istikhdâm al-Aql, 1999)
Islam dan Kebebasan Berekspresi Secara teoritis, kita dapat saja mengemukakan seabrek landasan teks yang menunjukkan garansi Islam untuk kebebasan berekspresi. Seorang pemikir Islam bernama Gamal Al-Banna, yakin betul kalau para pembela kebebasan berpikir, tak akan mampu memberikan garansi kebebasan (sampai untuk hal keyakinan) sebagaimana yang telah dikemukakan Alqur’an. Dalam beberapa ayat Alqur’an, beriman ataupun tidak, ditegaskan sebagai persoalan individu, bukan persoalan publik yang menuntut intervensi kekuasaan dalam beragam bentuknya, tak terkecuali kuasa rijaluddin atau jamaah kesalehan. Manusia betul-betul otonom dan hanya Tuhan pemegang hak prerogatif untuk vonis pengadilan-Nya. (Majalah Adab wa Naqd, vol. 179, edisi Juli 2000).
Dalam buku fikih barunya, Al-Banna lebih lanjut merumuskan hal kebebasan berekspresi itu. Ibarat pohon, dia menjadikan kebebasan berkeyakinan (hurriyyat al-aqîdah), sebagai pokok (al-‘ashl) yang memiliki cabang-cabang (al-furû‘) kebebasan lainnya: kebebasan berpikir, kegiatan pers, penerbitan dan lain sebagainya. Al-Banna memberikan pijakan kebebasan itu dari inspirasi Qur’ani seperti firman Allah: “Apakah Engkau memaksakan orang-orang, sehingga menjadi komunitas beriman?” Namun, Al-Banna mengaku, inspirasi kebebasan --dalam banyak dimensinya-- yang dia ambilkan dari landasan Qur’ani itu, akan berseberangan atau malah bertolak belakang dengan gagasan-gagasan “mapan” para “ahli fikih” yang memiliki institusi keagamaan. Sebab, sebagaimana biasanya, mereka yang berlindung di balik institusi keagamaan itu, berpotensi memonopoli kebenaran dan menekan orang-orang yang berbeda gagasan dengan mereka (Nahwa Fiqh Jadîd, 1999).
Apa yang ditorehkan Al-Banna itu dibuktikan Al-Baghdadi dengan contoh konkretnya. Menurutnya, negara-negara Muslim adalah deretan negara yang paling girang mengusir para pemikir, periset dan akademisi. Bagi dia, aliran-aliran keagamaan berusaha menyiksa setiap pemikir yang liberal. Ironisnya, masyarakat Barat menampung mereka yang tertindas itu, untuk kemudian kita berbalik menuduh Barat melakukan konspirasi terhadap Islam. Padahal, aliran keagamaan, dengan logika keras dan terbelakangnya, lebih menyiksa Islam itu sendiri. Al-Baghdadi mengingatkan, persemaian Islam di Barat, bukan hanya buah militansi juru dakwah Islam di sana, tapi juga akibat tidak langsung dari iklim kebebasan berekspresi yang sudah terkonsolidasi dengan baik.
Kritikan Al-Baghdadi di atas tentu pahit adanya. Orang pun mungkin akan yakin, kalau Al-Baghdadi tidak sepenuhnya benar. Sebab, sudah barang tentu banyak faktor lain yang menyebabkan terusirnya para pemikir dari negeri Islam, selain tekanan konservatifisme pandangan keagamaan. Namun, kritik itu menemukan relevansinya sebagai peringatan agar agama tidak secara semena-mena digunakan sebagai penghalang penyemaian ilmu pengetahuan dan kebebasan berekspresi. Dalam konteks ini, aliran-aliran keagamaan betul-betul ditagih tantangan: bagaimana memberi garansi, bahwa ideal Islam yang menjunjung tinggi akal, pengetahuan dan kebebasan, dapat bermakna dalam sebuah masyaratak Islam dengan ragam-ragam alirannya. Semoga saja!
Novriantoni
Suatu ketika, di sebuah apotik di kota Kairo, sekonyong-konyong seorang laki-laki bertanya kepada Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd, pemikir Islam dari Mesir yang dituduh murtad karena pemikirannya tentang Alqur’an, “Bukankah Anda bernama Nasr?.” “Ya,” jawab pemikir Islam yang bertubuh gemuk itu. “Apakah Anda orang yang disebut-sebut murtad itu?” kata laki-laki itu memburu. Dengan heran, Nasr balik bertanya: “Anda percaya?” Hm, rupanya kabar burung sampai ke telinga lelaki itu, kalau pakar ilmu Alqur’an itu melecehkan Alqur’an. Lantas, Nasr bertanya lagi, “Pernahkah Anda membaca salah satu buku karanganku?” Dengan jujur, pria itu menjawab, “Sungguh, belum sama sekali!” Pada akhirnya, Nasr memberi wejangan untuk penuduh yang belum membaca bukunya itu: “Aku harap, Engkau mau membacanya. Selanjutnya, berserah dirilah pada Allah!” (Al-Hurriyyah fî Sabîl-i-Allâh, 1994)
Kasus lain lagi. Kabar teranyar dari Mesir mengungkapkan, seorang dai muda kondang selevel Aa’ Gim, bernama Amr Khalid, dilarang pemerintah melanjutkan aktivitas dakwahnya. Tanpa alasan yang kuat, kemungkinan menyangkut masalah kepantasan politik (al-mulâamah al-siyâsiyyah), Amr terpaksa rehat dari tugas amar makruf nahi munkar. Sebagai catatan, sampai kini, pemerintah Mesir masih memberlakukan undang-undang darurat (qânûn al-thawâri’) yang mirip undang-undang subversif a la ORBA. Di belahan dunia lain, tapatnya di Libia, sebuah masjid “disucikan” dari golongan zindiq karena desas-desus mengajarkan “aliran sesat”. Massa beramai-ramai mendatangi mereka agar pensiun dari pengajian dengan rupa-rupa ancaman. Kedua hikayah ini disesalkan secara mendalam oleh pemikir moderat Islam, Fahmi Huwaidi dalam kolomnya setiap Senin di harian Asharq Alawsat (29/7/2002).
Peristiwa di atas memang tidak terjadi di Indonesia. Tapi tentu hal semacam itu bisa terjadi di mana-mana, termasuk di Indonesia. Kita masih ingat, bagaimana kasus sweeping “buku kiri”, pendudukan media massa, dan banyak kasus lain, masih menyiratkan trauma untuk hal kebebasan berekspresi. Sebuah negara yang memiliki perangkat perundang-undangan kebebasan berekspresi yang lemah, akan lebih rawan mengalami kejadian serupa. Sekilas terlihat, kasus Nasr Hamid, Amr Khalid, masjid di Libia, sweeping “buku kiri” dan pendudukan media, berdiri sendiri-sendiri dan tampak berbeda. Tapi sebetulnya, semua itu termasuk antrian problem serius dunia Islam: kebebasan berekspresi masih payah. Salah satu tugas penting dan mendesak kemudian, bagaimana kebebasan berekspresi dijamin baik oleh undang-undang maupun masyarakat yang lama terkekang.
Teror Penguasa dan Teror Massa Paling tidak, ada dua bentuk teror yang dapat ditangkap dari contoh-contoh di atas. Pada kasus Amr, pengekangan kebebasan dipertontonkan penguasa politik secara berlebihan. Itu belum seberapa. Beberapa waktu lalu, pemerintah Mesir juga memenjarakan beberapa akademisi yang disinyalir kuat sebagai aktivis Ikhwanul Muslimin. Alasannya, bukan karena mereka melakukan teror dan tindakan destruktif lainnya, tapi lebih karena mereka kritis. Penangkapan semena-mena oleh rezim penguasa di dunia Islam, tentu tidak sekali dua kita dengar. Cerita yang sama sudah jamak kita dengar dan mengakumulasi menjadi krisis kebebasan yang memasung, bahkan ragam-ragam potensi umat.
Dalam kasus kedua, masyarakat yang tidak terbiasa dengan kebebasan, mempertontonkan suasana prasangka dan ketakutan yang berlebihan. Mereka terpaksa menjadi “masyarakat ternak”. Akibatnya, mereka yang sudah lama tidak menikmati kebebasan itu, tanpa sadar membuat kerangkeng kebebasan bagi diri mereka lagi. Fenomena seperti ini disoroti tajam oleh pemikir liberal bernama Salamah Musa. Menurutnya, selain pemerintah yang phobia kebebasan, masyarakat juga tak jarang berperan besar memasung kebebasan. Dalam banyak kasus, massa lebih cepat bertindak dan menghajar mereka yang keluar dari kebiasaan --baik agama, maupun bukan agama-- mereka. Sementara itu, pemerintah berpangku tangan seolah memberkati “inisiatif” masyarakat itu. (Hurriyyat al-Fikr wa Ibhtâluhâ fi al-Târîkh, 1975)
Kasus teror oleh kekuasaan, boleh jadi bisa diobati dengan proses demokratisasi dan perundang-undangan yang menjamin kebebasan. Ini setidaknya dapat pembenarannya dari negara-negara muslim yang beranjak ke arah demokratisasi. Namun, teror pemikiran/mental/fisik (al-irhâb al-fikrî/al-maknâwî/al-jasadî) yang dilakukan masyarakat, obatnya jauh lebih sulit. Teror pemikiran yang dilakukan massa tertentu, taruhlah gerakan keagamaan yang ekstrim, berdiri di atas tingkat budaya pemikiran dan fanatisme lama yang mendarahdaging di masyarakat. Dalam hal seperti ini, perundang-undangan tidak mampu menawarkan obat, sekiranya tidak didukung/diperkuat opini publik yang prokebebasan, toleransi dan pluralisme. Lebih dari itu, masyarakat perlu mendapat pendidikan tentang bagaimana menikmati kebebasan seraya taat pada hukum. Kondisi kebebasan yang terjamin dan ideal ini tampaknya masih jauh panggang dari api di dunia Islam. Maka, pantas bila Thomas Friedman dalam komentarnya tentang vonis pengadilan yang memenangkan kasus pengajaran ilmu Alqur’an di North Carolina University belakangan ini, menyindir soal kebebasan umat Islam dengan sinis: “Bagaimana reaksi Bin Ladin, sekiranya Bibel diajarkan di salah satu perguruan tinggi Islam?” Masing-masing kita, mungkin tahu jawabnya.
Mahalnya Kebebasan Dari pemandangan di atas, terasa betapa mahal harga kebebasan berekspresi di dunia Islam. Jika kita yakin bahwa agama berperan sentral dalam pembentukan watak bangsa, mau tidak mau kita mesti menagih garansi kebebasan dari agama itu sendiri. Ya, garansi kebebasan berekspresi harus dicarikan dari doktrin terdalam agama. Perlu diakui, bahwa tema kebebasan berekspresi termasuk tema “yang tak terpikirkan” dalam pembahasan pemikiran keislaman. Sama halnya dengan tema demokrasi, HAM, interreligious dialogue, pluralisme, dan tema-tema yang menjadi kebutuhan kontemporer, kebebasan berekspresi menjadi tema yang terabaikan dan tidak terlihat penting dalam kajian-kajian keislaman.
Rasanya perlu dicatat, berbagai perdebatan pemikiran yang berkembang di kalangan umat Islam, semacam wacana apakah Alquran itu makhluk atau bukan, tidak dirayakan sebagai wacana yang dengan santainya dapat berseliweran di muka publik. Karena sesak oleh perdebatan, wacana-wacana yang multitafsir itu, dicarikan kata putusnya dari kekuasaan politik maupun kekerasan massa. Tragedi Ibnu Hanbal dapat menjadi sampel lama untuk masalah ini.
Fenomena menyedihkan ini disesalkan dengan baik oleh Ahmad Al-Baghdadi, seorang pemikir kritis dari Kuwait. Menurutnya, kebebasan berekspresi adalah bagian kebebasan yang tidak dinikmati, kecuali sedikit dalam sejarah negara Islam. Wacana publik tidak jarang berakhir dengan darah saat kekuasaan melakukan intervensi. Al-Baghdadi menilai, dialog bukan keutamaan (fadlâil) umat Islam, meskipun kita mengantongi firman Allah, “…Sanggahlah mereka dengan (argumen/sikap) yang baik. Sesungguhnya, hanya Tuhanmulah yang Mahatahu siapa yang menyimpang dari jalan-Nya dan Dia Mahatahu mereka-mereka yang terbimbing.” (Tajdîd al-Firk al-Dînî: Da‘wat li al-Istikhdâm al-Aql, 1999)
Islam dan Kebebasan Berekspresi Secara teoritis, kita dapat saja mengemukakan seabrek landasan teks yang menunjukkan garansi Islam untuk kebebasan berekspresi. Seorang pemikir Islam bernama Gamal Al-Banna, yakin betul kalau para pembela kebebasan berpikir, tak akan mampu memberikan garansi kebebasan (sampai untuk hal keyakinan) sebagaimana yang telah dikemukakan Alqur’an. Dalam beberapa ayat Alqur’an, beriman ataupun tidak, ditegaskan sebagai persoalan individu, bukan persoalan publik yang menuntut intervensi kekuasaan dalam beragam bentuknya, tak terkecuali kuasa rijaluddin atau jamaah kesalehan. Manusia betul-betul otonom dan hanya Tuhan pemegang hak prerogatif untuk vonis pengadilan-Nya. (Majalah Adab wa Naqd, vol. 179, edisi Juli 2000).
Dalam buku fikih barunya, Al-Banna lebih lanjut merumuskan hal kebebasan berekspresi itu. Ibarat pohon, dia menjadikan kebebasan berkeyakinan (hurriyyat al-aqîdah), sebagai pokok (al-‘ashl) yang memiliki cabang-cabang (al-furû‘) kebebasan lainnya: kebebasan berpikir, kegiatan pers, penerbitan dan lain sebagainya. Al-Banna memberikan pijakan kebebasan itu dari inspirasi Qur’ani seperti firman Allah: “Apakah Engkau memaksakan orang-orang, sehingga menjadi komunitas beriman?” Namun, Al-Banna mengaku, inspirasi kebebasan --dalam banyak dimensinya-- yang dia ambilkan dari landasan Qur’ani itu, akan berseberangan atau malah bertolak belakang dengan gagasan-gagasan “mapan” para “ahli fikih” yang memiliki institusi keagamaan. Sebab, sebagaimana biasanya, mereka yang berlindung di balik institusi keagamaan itu, berpotensi memonopoli kebenaran dan menekan orang-orang yang berbeda gagasan dengan mereka (Nahwa Fiqh Jadîd, 1999).
Apa yang ditorehkan Al-Banna itu dibuktikan Al-Baghdadi dengan contoh konkretnya. Menurutnya, negara-negara Muslim adalah deretan negara yang paling girang mengusir para pemikir, periset dan akademisi. Bagi dia, aliran-aliran keagamaan berusaha menyiksa setiap pemikir yang liberal. Ironisnya, masyarakat Barat menampung mereka yang tertindas itu, untuk kemudian kita berbalik menuduh Barat melakukan konspirasi terhadap Islam. Padahal, aliran keagamaan, dengan logika keras dan terbelakangnya, lebih menyiksa Islam itu sendiri. Al-Baghdadi mengingatkan, persemaian Islam di Barat, bukan hanya buah militansi juru dakwah Islam di sana, tapi juga akibat tidak langsung dari iklim kebebasan berekspresi yang sudah terkonsolidasi dengan baik.
Kritikan Al-Baghdadi di atas tentu pahit adanya. Orang pun mungkin akan yakin, kalau Al-Baghdadi tidak sepenuhnya benar. Sebab, sudah barang tentu banyak faktor lain yang menyebabkan terusirnya para pemikir dari negeri Islam, selain tekanan konservatifisme pandangan keagamaan. Namun, kritik itu menemukan relevansinya sebagai peringatan agar agama tidak secara semena-mena digunakan sebagai penghalang penyemaian ilmu pengetahuan dan kebebasan berekspresi. Dalam konteks ini, aliran-aliran keagamaan betul-betul ditagih tantangan: bagaimana memberi garansi, bahwa ideal Islam yang menjunjung tinggi akal, pengetahuan dan kebebasan, dapat bermakna dalam sebuah masyaratak Islam dengan ragam-ragam alirannya. Semoga saja!
Novriantoni
Refleksi Maulid Nabi SAW
26/05/2002
Apa reaksi kaum Quraisy sekiranya Nabi SAW hanya menganjurkan prinsip tauhid? Pertanyaan ini datang dari seorang pemikir Mesir, Thâha Husein dalam bukunya al-Fitnah al-Kubrâ (petaka besar). Menurut Thâhâ, andai tauhid saja, minus sistem sosial dan ekonomi, tentu banyak orang Quraisy menyambut seruan Muhammad dengan mudah. Thâhâ beralasan, bahwa orang Quraisy pada hakikatnya tidak secara penuh percaya berhala, juga tidak benar-benar mempertahankan “tuhan-tuhan” mereka itu. Berhala-berhala itu, hanya sekedar alat, bukan tujuan. Alat untuk mengelabui semua orang Arab agar mudah ditipu dan diperas.
Orang yang menilai Nabi semata menyeru Tauhîd, sebagai lawan tanding Ta‘addud (politeis) anutan Arab kala itu, tentu keberatan dengan pendapat Thâhâ. Tapi bila struktur sosial-budaya-politik-ekonomi Arab pra-Islam ditilik lebih cermat, tentulah pendapat itu tidak mengejutkan. Memang, konsep ketuhanan Quraisy terkesan konyol. Kekonyolah itu digambarkan dengan baik oleh Muhammad ‘Abduh. Menurutnya, masyarakat Arab pra-Islam sudah tidak waras/keblinger (sakhîf al-‘aql). Buktinya, sebagian memproduk berhala dari manisan (al-halawiy) untuk dijadikan sesembahan. Lucunya, ketika lapar menghantui, mereka tidak sungkan menyantap “tuhan-tuhan” mereka (Risâlat al-Tauhîd, hal 121).
Tapi, ketololan konsep ketuhanan Arab Jahili tidaklah penting. Ada yang lebih penting diungkap sebagai refleksi maulid nabi kali ini. Yaitu melacak pesan-pesan profetik yang terkadung di dalamnya. Yang terpenting dan sangat relevan untuk diungkap kini ada tiga hal: 1) persamaan (al-musâwât, equality), 2) kebebasan (al-hurriyyah, liberty), dan 3) keadilan (al-‘adâlah, justice). Ketiga prinsip yang menjadi nilai ideal orang modern ini sudah ditanamkan dengan kuat oleh Nabi kala itu. Karenanya, sosiolog yang sering dikutip Cak Nur, Robert N. Bellah, cukup cermat dan jujur ketika mengatakan bahwa sistim politik yang digariskan Nabi di Madinah dan dikembangkan khalifah-khalifah awal, khususnya Khalifah Umar adalah sesuatu yang terlampau maju bagi organisasi politik Arab yang ada sebelumnya.
Mungkin, karena terlampau modern bagi masyarakat yang sepenuhnya belum tercerabut dari nilai-nilai jahili Arab, utamanya masalah tribalisme (kesukuan, al-qabîliyyah), ketiga nilai tersebut akhirnya mengalami pasang surut. Terbukti, kecamuk politik bermotif fanatisme kesukuan yang merebak pada akhir masa khalifah ketiga, kembali merenggut sebagian nilai-nilai modern tersebut. Tapi biarlah, meratapi/memuja masa lalu bukanlah pekerjaan yang arif. Yang penting, bagaimana kembali menghidupkan pesan-pesan profetik yang pernah hidup itu untuk konteks kekinian dan kedisinian. Ini perlu dan mendesak, lebih-lebih karena nilai-nilai itu muncul tenggelam, untuk tidak mengatakannya terdistorsi, dianaktirikan, diplintir, dikangkangi ataupun dipandang sebelah mata. Padahal, esensi agama-agama terletak dalam nilai-nilai kebaikan universal itu. Wallahu ‘alam bissawab. []
Apa reaksi kaum Quraisy sekiranya Nabi SAW hanya menganjurkan prinsip tauhid? Pertanyaan ini datang dari seorang pemikir Mesir, Thâha Husein dalam bukunya al-Fitnah al-Kubrâ (petaka besar). Menurut Thâhâ, andai tauhid saja, minus sistem sosial dan ekonomi, tentu banyak orang Quraisy menyambut seruan Muhammad dengan mudah. Thâhâ beralasan, bahwa orang Quraisy pada hakikatnya tidak secara penuh percaya berhala, juga tidak benar-benar mempertahankan “tuhan-tuhan” mereka itu. Berhala-berhala itu, hanya sekedar alat, bukan tujuan. Alat untuk mengelabui semua orang Arab agar mudah ditipu dan diperas.
Orang yang menilai Nabi semata menyeru Tauhîd, sebagai lawan tanding Ta‘addud (politeis) anutan Arab kala itu, tentu keberatan dengan pendapat Thâhâ. Tapi bila struktur sosial-budaya-politik-ekonomi Arab pra-Islam ditilik lebih cermat, tentulah pendapat itu tidak mengejutkan. Memang, konsep ketuhanan Quraisy terkesan konyol. Kekonyolah itu digambarkan dengan baik oleh Muhammad ‘Abduh. Menurutnya, masyarakat Arab pra-Islam sudah tidak waras/keblinger (sakhîf al-‘aql). Buktinya, sebagian memproduk berhala dari manisan (al-halawiy) untuk dijadikan sesembahan. Lucunya, ketika lapar menghantui, mereka tidak sungkan menyantap “tuhan-tuhan” mereka (Risâlat al-Tauhîd, hal 121).
Tapi, ketololan konsep ketuhanan Arab Jahili tidaklah penting. Ada yang lebih penting diungkap sebagai refleksi maulid nabi kali ini. Yaitu melacak pesan-pesan profetik yang terkadung di dalamnya. Yang terpenting dan sangat relevan untuk diungkap kini ada tiga hal: 1) persamaan (al-musâwât, equality), 2) kebebasan (al-hurriyyah, liberty), dan 3) keadilan (al-‘adâlah, justice). Ketiga prinsip yang menjadi nilai ideal orang modern ini sudah ditanamkan dengan kuat oleh Nabi kala itu. Karenanya, sosiolog yang sering dikutip Cak Nur, Robert N. Bellah, cukup cermat dan jujur ketika mengatakan bahwa sistim politik yang digariskan Nabi di Madinah dan dikembangkan khalifah-khalifah awal, khususnya Khalifah Umar adalah sesuatu yang terlampau maju bagi organisasi politik Arab yang ada sebelumnya.
Mungkin, karena terlampau modern bagi masyarakat yang sepenuhnya belum tercerabut dari nilai-nilai jahili Arab, utamanya masalah tribalisme (kesukuan, al-qabîliyyah), ketiga nilai tersebut akhirnya mengalami pasang surut. Terbukti, kecamuk politik bermotif fanatisme kesukuan yang merebak pada akhir masa khalifah ketiga, kembali merenggut sebagian nilai-nilai modern tersebut. Tapi biarlah, meratapi/memuja masa lalu bukanlah pekerjaan yang arif. Yang penting, bagaimana kembali menghidupkan pesan-pesan profetik yang pernah hidup itu untuk konteks kekinian dan kedisinian. Ini perlu dan mendesak, lebih-lebih karena nilai-nilai itu muncul tenggelam, untuk tidak mengatakannya terdistorsi, dianaktirikan, diplintir, dikangkangi ataupun dipandang sebelah mata. Padahal, esensi agama-agama terletak dalam nilai-nilai kebaikan universal itu. Wallahu ‘alam bissawab. []
A Religious "Overdose"
(This article is previously published in Indonesian on 7/3/2005)
Fulan was an employee at a government office who had graduated from a state university. Several months ago, he was dismissed as he had become engaged in disputes about religion with his colleagues too often.
The problem started when Fulan became overly involved in religious activities. In his ever growing fantasy, he came to present himself as the only pious Muslim at work (salafush shâleh) and as the only person there who had a ticket to heaven.
Though his colleagues and his wife were disturbed by Fulan’s mental turmoil, he himself did not regret losing his job or his mental changes. He still persisted in his beliefs and interpreted such trials as the result of his struggle. Although his wife and children suffered the consequences, to him it did not matter. When his wife began to complain that Fulan’s behavior was becoming more and more authoritarian and violent, he ignored her, frequently leaving his home and neglecting his responsibility to take care of the household expenses.
It is hard to find adequate language to explain what happened to Fulan though an understanding of the psychology of religion may help. Religion according to psychologists can be the source of many problems ranging from mental disease to orthodoxy, dogmatism, racial presumption, and violence. In fact, a dogmatic, orthodox and overly pious religious perception correlates significantly with emotional disorder. On the contrary, as Jalaluddin Rahmat writes in Psikologi Agama, mentally stable people tend to be lenient, open-minded, tolerant, and open to change. In contrast, religious persons tend to be rigid, introverted, intolerant, and incapable of change.
In the above view, psychologists have an extreme and negative perception of religion. However, this framework is still relevant for explaining Fulan’s condition which is common among religious zealots. Using medical terminology, we can understand Fulan’s experience in terms of it being an illness from an overdose of religion which caused an extreme change in his religious perspective, attitude and behavior. In his case, religion which should have been a form of medicine (syifa) but it became a poison instead because of over-dosing. This incident became a topic of discussion during Liberal Islamic Network’s fourth anniversary.
The problem is that such religious overdoses can become social epidemics and culminate in international tragedies as Ioanes Rakhmat pointed out for the case of Christian Zionism. Rakhmat believes that the Christian Zionist Movement is suffering from a religious overdose since they have used religion as a reason for war and sponsored hatred for other religions and races. Taking a different approach, Lies Marcoes, another speaker in the discussion, asserted that an overdose of religion – just as is the case with drugs - will eventually destroy the victim’s mind.
Indeed, it is because of these destructive effects of being overly pious that religious treatises have long warned adepts to beware of overdosing on religion. Thus it is that in Islam, the Qur’an and Hadits warn disciples not to exaggerate their religiosity: lâ taghlû fî dînikum.
[Novriantoni]
Fulan was an employee at a government office who had graduated from a state university. Several months ago, he was dismissed as he had become engaged in disputes about religion with his colleagues too often.
The problem started when Fulan became overly involved in religious activities. In his ever growing fantasy, he came to present himself as the only pious Muslim at work (salafush shâleh) and as the only person there who had a ticket to heaven.
Though his colleagues and his wife were disturbed by Fulan’s mental turmoil, he himself did not regret losing his job or his mental changes. He still persisted in his beliefs and interpreted such trials as the result of his struggle. Although his wife and children suffered the consequences, to him it did not matter. When his wife began to complain that Fulan’s behavior was becoming more and more authoritarian and violent, he ignored her, frequently leaving his home and neglecting his responsibility to take care of the household expenses.
It is hard to find adequate language to explain what happened to Fulan though an understanding of the psychology of religion may help. Religion according to psychologists can be the source of many problems ranging from mental disease to orthodoxy, dogmatism, racial presumption, and violence. In fact, a dogmatic, orthodox and overly pious religious perception correlates significantly with emotional disorder. On the contrary, as Jalaluddin Rahmat writes in Psikologi Agama, mentally stable people tend to be lenient, open-minded, tolerant, and open to change. In contrast, religious persons tend to be rigid, introverted, intolerant, and incapable of change.
In the above view, psychologists have an extreme and negative perception of religion. However, this framework is still relevant for explaining Fulan’s condition which is common among religious zealots. Using medical terminology, we can understand Fulan’s experience in terms of it being an illness from an overdose of religion which caused an extreme change in his religious perspective, attitude and behavior. In his case, religion which should have been a form of medicine (syifa) but it became a poison instead because of over-dosing. This incident became a topic of discussion during Liberal Islamic Network’s fourth anniversary.
The problem is that such religious overdoses can become social epidemics and culminate in international tragedies as Ioanes Rakhmat pointed out for the case of Christian Zionism. Rakhmat believes that the Christian Zionist Movement is suffering from a religious overdose since they have used religion as a reason for war and sponsored hatred for other religions and races. Taking a different approach, Lies Marcoes, another speaker in the discussion, asserted that an overdose of religion – just as is the case with drugs - will eventually destroy the victim’s mind.
Indeed, it is because of these destructive effects of being overly pious that religious treatises have long warned adepts to beware of overdosing on religion. Thus it is that in Islam, the Qur’an and Hadits warn disciples not to exaggerate their religiosity: lâ taghlû fî dînikum.
[Novriantoni]
Polygamy and Justice
Published: 28/4/2002
Polygamy is one of the issues criticized by feminists in general and Muslim feminists in particular. This tradition of marrying more than one wife (mistresses), is always controversial. There is a matter of textual interpretation involved. In Al Qur’an, there is a verse that explicitly allows for polygamy. This verse becomes the weapon for polygamy’s advocates to justify it in an Islamic perspective. But one should not forget, that the verse following the verse above contains the strict restriction: the matter of justice: “….and if you fear that you cannot do justice (to so many) then (marry) one only . . . .” The Muslim community should ask then: what is the nature of marriage in Islam?
The first verses about polygamy in the Qur’an, seem to support polygamy. Ordinary logic also supports the Qur’an: try two first; if you still desire, three; if there is still a will and ability, you may take four. Some Muslim communities even prefer to have more wives than ever mentioned in Al Qur’an. Yet what is often forgotten is the spirit of this “polygamy verse”. Therein polygamy is a matter of justice. Justice for whom? Of course for the women because woman are the objects of polygamy.
God also asserted “you could not do justice, even if you try hard for it”. The Prophet himself admitted that his heart tended toward Aisha more than to any other wives. She was the only prophet’s wife who was a virgin, brilliant, and jealously spoiled. The Prophet could not do justice in the matters of the heart and less still those in his community.
If this is the contextual logic of verses on polygamy, we might ask: what is the real ideal in Islamic marriage? If this question was presented to a reformer such Muhammad Abduh, he would answer: monogamy. Don’t believe it? Read Abduh’s complete compilations: al-A’mal al-Kamilah. There, sheltered behind the view of Abduh who is the Egyptian mufti, “the male feminist” named Qasim Amin, advocates monogamy and even more than that in his magnum opus: Tahrir al-Mar’ah (woman’s liberation).
Polygamy is one of the issues criticized by feminists in general and Muslim feminists in particular. This tradition of marrying more than one wife (mistresses), is always controversial. There is a matter of textual interpretation involved. In Al Qur’an, there is a verse that explicitly allows for polygamy. This verse becomes the weapon for polygamy’s advocates to justify it in an Islamic perspective. But one should not forget, that the verse following the verse above contains the strict restriction: the matter of justice: “….and if you fear that you cannot do justice (to so many) then (marry) one only . . . .” The Muslim community should ask then: what is the nature of marriage in Islam?
The first verses about polygamy in the Qur’an, seem to support polygamy. Ordinary logic also supports the Qur’an: try two first; if you still desire, three; if there is still a will and ability, you may take four. Some Muslim communities even prefer to have more wives than ever mentioned in Al Qur’an. Yet what is often forgotten is the spirit of this “polygamy verse”. Therein polygamy is a matter of justice. Justice for whom? Of course for the women because woman are the objects of polygamy.
God also asserted “you could not do justice, even if you try hard for it”. The Prophet himself admitted that his heart tended toward Aisha more than to any other wives. She was the only prophet’s wife who was a virgin, brilliant, and jealously spoiled. The Prophet could not do justice in the matters of the heart and less still those in his community.
If this is the contextual logic of verses on polygamy, we might ask: what is the real ideal in Islamic marriage? If this question was presented to a reformer such Muhammad Abduh, he would answer: monogamy. Don’t believe it? Read Abduh’s complete compilations: al-A’mal al-Kamilah. There, sheltered behind the view of Abduh who is the Egyptian mufti, “the male feminist” named Qasim Amin, advocates monogamy and even more than that in his magnum opus: Tahrir al-Mar’ah (woman’s liberation).
Al-Banna
This article was previously published in Indonesian at 9/8/2004
Many people object if Islam is assumed not to regulate politics. They argue that Islam is not merely “divine teaching” which does not touch real life of human. Islam as a religion is comprehensive regulating all human’s matters, from waking up until going to bed again. Since Islam regulates everything –according to this totalistic approach upon Islam—hence, politic is included. Therefore, a slogan developed –especially among the Muslim revivalists—that “Islam is religion and state” (al-islâm din wa daulah).
In the history of modern Islamic politics, the slogan is a denial of Muslim revival of the strong political secularization within the Muslim world, especially after the fall of the Caliphate system (in fact the Ottoman Turk Empire) in 1924. The slogan of “Islam is religion and state” was raised by various Muslim revivalist movement, especially Al-Ikhwanul Muslimun and Hizbut Tahrir. Slowly, the slogan became he dominant paradigm of thinking among Muslims, especially those in the political wing.
They conveyed various arguments supporting the validity of this paradigm. For instance, in Islamic history, since the age of Prophet up to the present globalization era, Islam has never stopped being in politics. Muslim groups have become political entities that are always considered whenever they are powerful, and scare authoritative regimes. Their argument strengthened Arkoun’s thesis who said that in fact, in the history of Islamic politic there is a “softer theocracy” than the Europe’s practice in the Medieval Age. Oddly, by cursing the interaction between religion and politics in the Medieval Age of Europe, several Islamic group expected that religion run the state political authority. This paradigm rules the Islamic political reasoning up to now, the moderate as well as the radical one.
Fortunately, Gamal al-Banna lately appears –the youngest brother of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of Al-Ikhwanul Muslimun (Muslim Brethren)—who tried to criticize and against that paradigm, by introducing new paradigm about the relation between religion and politics. Through his book, Al-Islâm: Dîn wa Ummah wa Laitsa Dîn wa Daulah (2003), al-Banna writes firmly against the paradigm of Islam as religion and state. To him, Islam is not religion and state, but religion and ummah (Muslim society). Both are different, since the first is more political and power oriented, while the second is cultural and ummah (social) oriented.
Al-Banna’s study on the basic nature of political authority –including Islamic political authority—concluded that political and state authority has distorted religion. To al-Banna, political power carries more damage than religious benefit. When it comes to real politics, religion will function to legitimate the authority and will be destructive. Therefore, al-Banna proposed the urgency of emphasizing religious cultural orientation rather than politics and authority. The right slogan according to al-Banna, is not “Islam as religion and state” (dîn wa daulah), but “Islam as religion and ummah” (dîn wa ummah). [Novriantoni]
Many people object if Islam is assumed not to regulate politics. They argue that Islam is not merely “divine teaching” which does not touch real life of human. Islam as a religion is comprehensive regulating all human’s matters, from waking up until going to bed again. Since Islam regulates everything –according to this totalistic approach upon Islam—hence, politic is included. Therefore, a slogan developed –especially among the Muslim revivalists—that “Islam is religion and state” (al-islâm din wa daulah).
In the history of modern Islamic politics, the slogan is a denial of Muslim revival of the strong political secularization within the Muslim world, especially after the fall of the Caliphate system (in fact the Ottoman Turk Empire) in 1924. The slogan of “Islam is religion and state” was raised by various Muslim revivalist movement, especially Al-Ikhwanul Muslimun and Hizbut Tahrir. Slowly, the slogan became he dominant paradigm of thinking among Muslims, especially those in the political wing.
They conveyed various arguments supporting the validity of this paradigm. For instance, in Islamic history, since the age of Prophet up to the present globalization era, Islam has never stopped being in politics. Muslim groups have become political entities that are always considered whenever they are powerful, and scare authoritative regimes. Their argument strengthened Arkoun’s thesis who said that in fact, in the history of Islamic politic there is a “softer theocracy” than the Europe’s practice in the Medieval Age. Oddly, by cursing the interaction between religion and politics in the Medieval Age of Europe, several Islamic group expected that religion run the state political authority. This paradigm rules the Islamic political reasoning up to now, the moderate as well as the radical one.
Fortunately, Gamal al-Banna lately appears –the youngest brother of Hasan al-Banna, the founder of Al-Ikhwanul Muslimun (Muslim Brethren)—who tried to criticize and against that paradigm, by introducing new paradigm about the relation between religion and politics. Through his book, Al-Islâm: Dîn wa Ummah wa Laitsa Dîn wa Daulah (2003), al-Banna writes firmly against the paradigm of Islam as religion and state. To him, Islam is not religion and state, but religion and ummah (Muslim society). Both are different, since the first is more political and power oriented, while the second is cultural and ummah (social) oriented.
Al-Banna’s study on the basic nature of political authority –including Islamic political authority—concluded that political and state authority has distorted religion. To al-Banna, political power carries more damage than religious benefit. When it comes to real politics, religion will function to legitimate the authority and will be destructive. Therefore, al-Banna proposed the urgency of emphasizing religious cultural orientation rather than politics and authority. The right slogan according to al-Banna, is not “Islam as religion and state” (dîn wa daulah), but “Islam as religion and ummah” (dîn wa ummah). [Novriantoni]
Islam, Liberty, and Justice
Published: 24/11/2002
Which is more important in the Islamic point of view: liberty or justice? This question is significant in terms of the current dilemma Muslims are in. Liberty and justice appear to clash with each other. In fact, the Muslim countries are unable to balance liberty and justice, if the haven’t indeed already lost both.
Ideally, both principles should be upheld by the state. Instead Muslims are often forced to opt for one or the other even though the consequences are not beneficial. It is common to hear Islamists criticizing capitalism as being opposed to liberty and proposing that socialism is an alternative system providing utopian justice. Islam (theoretically) is thought to provide a middle ground between capitalism and socialism guaranteeing both liberty and justice.
Thaha Husein, the Egyptian Muslim thinker, in his book Al-fitnah Al-kubra, proposes that capitalism does serve as a basis for liberty but not for justice. On the other hand, contrary to the utopian beliefs, socialist experiments historically deny liberty and produce highly repressive systems. Moreover, Husein does not see Islamic ideology as a system that automatically guarantees liberty and justice since there have been many dialectical variations between the principles of liberty and justice in Islamic history.
Hence, even though Islam has always been idealised as a perfect (kâmil) and comprehensive (syâmil) system, the historical facts do not support this assertion. Globally, the Muslim society is commonly marked by the absence of liberty, a condition which leads to the absence of justice. On the contrary: where liberty has been experienced, justice has not. Consequently there is frustration, protest and misery and a call for a return to secular authoritarianism.
Initial Balance
In the early history of Islam, the principle of liberty and justice were the two most important pillars of society which Muslims sought to uphold enthusiastically. For example, the wise Caliphs such as Abu Bakr and Umar, always stressed the importance of criticizing their measures and thus an awareness of the importance of the principles of liberty and justice. In that period, liberty and justice were integral part (juz-un lâ yatajazza) of Muslim belief and the essence of the period’s historical importance. (Azzam, 1964: 103)
It was with pride that in that early period; the rulers accepted criticism whenever they deviated (i’wijâj) from public accountability. Indeed, the Muslim community is required to keep their rulers straight (taqwîm) through the traditional control mechanism established in the Qur’an and by prophetic tradition. That mechanism is known as syûrâ or dialogue mechanism and is not an indigenous Islamic characteristic, but a pre-Islamic Arabic tradition. According to sociologist Robert N. Bellah, those values are very modern for that period (al-qâbiliyyah). Nevertheless, this mechanism of checks and balances have not been used for a very long time now. For example, the contemporary Muslim thinker, Abied El-Jabiri, criticizes the lack of the current institutionalization of liberty and justice as originally codified in the Medina charter (mîtsâq al-madînah (El-Jabiri, 1992: 86. Thus we see that ideas influencing the Muslim’s political imagination today date back to ancient times.
The Dialectic of Liberty and Justice
In describing the relation in Islam between liberty and justice, the Muslim thinker Hassan Hanafi in his column in the Azzaman daily (20/9/2002) has proposed an interesting idea. In observing Islamic revivalist movement over the last two centuries, Hanafi concluded that within the revivalist camp, thought and movement, liberty and justice are both contradictory concepts (fikratâni li al-takâmul wa al-tanâqud ma‘an). Since Al-Afghani period, liberty and justice have had a dialectical relationship. At times liberty dominates, and at other times, justice subordinates liberty.
Ironically, the dialectic has lead to a disasterous situation in which has liberty has vanished and in which justice has never been realized. Hanafi describes the lack of liberty and justice in the Muslim world, as being analagous to society having both legs amputated (faqd al-sâqain). The Muslim world has failed to live up to the enthusiastic aims of the revivalist movement.
This Hanafi’s thesis can be further elaborated upon by looking at the Muslim world’s development since the spread of modern imperialism. When the Muslim community was first constrained by the twin forces of European imperialism and local despotism, al Afghani advanced two key agendas: independence from imperialism, and freedom from despotism. Liberty became the central aim because it is only through liberty that justice can be achieved. Here Umar bin Khattab’s remark on liberty serves as an important inspiration: “Why oppress humans, when they were born free?”
It is easy to conclude that during European imperialism, the call for freedom became a basic Islamic doctrine. The Muslim community’s consciousness seemed to believe that in a brighter past Islam had protected the principles of liberty. They believed that the earlier expansion of Islam from the East and West, from China to Spain, was related with the protection of liberty (Azzam 106) -- thus the term “Islamic liberation’s nature” (al-thâbi’ al-taharruriy) as used by M. Emarah.
What about justice? The demand for justice is also a key contemporary issue. In Islam, though justice is an essential motivation behind religious belief it is not always sought after (Boisard, 1980: 142). For example, in calling for economic justice and a farmer’s revolution, Al Afghani once said: “Those farmers are naïve! Everyday they hoe the earth, but they are not ready to hoe at the hearts of the rulers who oppress them.” Similarly, Sayyid Quthb, the famous Ikhwanul Muslimin’s thinker, also emphasized Islamic justice in his masterpiece: “Al-‘Adalah Al-Ijtimaiyyah fi Al-Islam” (social justice in an Islamic perspective).
Unfortunately, liberty and justice as complimentary principles have not become important pillars for development in Muslim countries since independence. Boisard has even written that historically speaking "Islam” had always been used to support oppression and tyranny. The Muslim community always defend themselves by arguing that the reason for this problematic history is that the communities do not actually respect Islamic norms (Boisard, 1980: 150).
Sharing the “Cake” of Liberty
Currently the Indonesian Muslim community enjoys a climate of relative liberty. Having differing opinions, gathering together for dialogue and discussion, is the national reformation’s sweetest fruit. There is a consensus, at least in elite circles, that this climate of relative religious liberty should be protected from despotism and authoritarianism. Liberty and democracy should be sought so as to repair the nation and provide hope for justice.
Ironically, some Islamic groups appear to “hate” this climate of liberty and democracy, claiming that democracy is a kafir system. Yet, this relative condition of liberty and democracy, which is not experienced by many other Muslim countries, is a precondition for growth and development of civil society. Therefore, positive perceptions towards liberty and democracy should be nurtured for the sake of the nation’s benefit. It is unethical for those who do not work for liberty to take the most advantage of it.
The government should utilize this momentum for achieving justice through seeing it as one of the Pancasila principles. Much evidence indicates that liberty without justice leads to the emergence of authoritative regimes. The Arabic saying that “justice is the supreme foundation" (al-‘adl asâs al-mulk) is relevant here, as is the saying: "no state without ruler, no ruler without funds, no funds without welfare, and no welfare without justice. Wallâh Alîm!
Novriantoni, The alumnus of Al-Azhar University Egypt and student of Master program of Indonesian University Jakarta.
Which is more important in the Islamic point of view: liberty or justice? This question is significant in terms of the current dilemma Muslims are in. Liberty and justice appear to clash with each other. In fact, the Muslim countries are unable to balance liberty and justice, if the haven’t indeed already lost both.
Ideally, both principles should be upheld by the state. Instead Muslims are often forced to opt for one or the other even though the consequences are not beneficial. It is common to hear Islamists criticizing capitalism as being opposed to liberty and proposing that socialism is an alternative system providing utopian justice. Islam (theoretically) is thought to provide a middle ground between capitalism and socialism guaranteeing both liberty and justice.
Thaha Husein, the Egyptian Muslim thinker, in his book Al-fitnah Al-kubra, proposes that capitalism does serve as a basis for liberty but not for justice. On the other hand, contrary to the utopian beliefs, socialist experiments historically deny liberty and produce highly repressive systems. Moreover, Husein does not see Islamic ideology as a system that automatically guarantees liberty and justice since there have been many dialectical variations between the principles of liberty and justice in Islamic history.
Hence, even though Islam has always been idealised as a perfect (kâmil) and comprehensive (syâmil) system, the historical facts do not support this assertion. Globally, the Muslim society is commonly marked by the absence of liberty, a condition which leads to the absence of justice. On the contrary: where liberty has been experienced, justice has not. Consequently there is frustration, protest and misery and a call for a return to secular authoritarianism.
Initial Balance
In the early history of Islam, the principle of liberty and justice were the two most important pillars of society which Muslims sought to uphold enthusiastically. For example, the wise Caliphs such as Abu Bakr and Umar, always stressed the importance of criticizing their measures and thus an awareness of the importance of the principles of liberty and justice. In that period, liberty and justice were integral part (juz-un lâ yatajazza) of Muslim belief and the essence of the period’s historical importance. (Azzam, 1964: 103)
It was with pride that in that early period; the rulers accepted criticism whenever they deviated (i’wijâj) from public accountability. Indeed, the Muslim community is required to keep their rulers straight (taqwîm) through the traditional control mechanism established in the Qur’an and by prophetic tradition. That mechanism is known as syûrâ or dialogue mechanism and is not an indigenous Islamic characteristic, but a pre-Islamic Arabic tradition. According to sociologist Robert N. Bellah, those values are very modern for that period (al-qâbiliyyah). Nevertheless, this mechanism of checks and balances have not been used for a very long time now. For example, the contemporary Muslim thinker, Abied El-Jabiri, criticizes the lack of the current institutionalization of liberty and justice as originally codified in the Medina charter (mîtsâq al-madînah (El-Jabiri, 1992: 86. Thus we see that ideas influencing the Muslim’s political imagination today date back to ancient times.
The Dialectic of Liberty and Justice
In describing the relation in Islam between liberty and justice, the Muslim thinker Hassan Hanafi in his column in the Azzaman daily (20/9/2002) has proposed an interesting idea. In observing Islamic revivalist movement over the last two centuries, Hanafi concluded that within the revivalist camp, thought and movement, liberty and justice are both contradictory concepts (fikratâni li al-takâmul wa al-tanâqud ma‘an). Since Al-Afghani period, liberty and justice have had a dialectical relationship. At times liberty dominates, and at other times, justice subordinates liberty.
Ironically, the dialectic has lead to a disasterous situation in which has liberty has vanished and in which justice has never been realized. Hanafi describes the lack of liberty and justice in the Muslim world, as being analagous to society having both legs amputated (faqd al-sâqain). The Muslim world has failed to live up to the enthusiastic aims of the revivalist movement.
This Hanafi’s thesis can be further elaborated upon by looking at the Muslim world’s development since the spread of modern imperialism. When the Muslim community was first constrained by the twin forces of European imperialism and local despotism, al Afghani advanced two key agendas: independence from imperialism, and freedom from despotism. Liberty became the central aim because it is only through liberty that justice can be achieved. Here Umar bin Khattab’s remark on liberty serves as an important inspiration: “Why oppress humans, when they were born free?”
It is easy to conclude that during European imperialism, the call for freedom became a basic Islamic doctrine. The Muslim community’s consciousness seemed to believe that in a brighter past Islam had protected the principles of liberty. They believed that the earlier expansion of Islam from the East and West, from China to Spain, was related with the protection of liberty (Azzam 106) -- thus the term “Islamic liberation’s nature” (al-thâbi’ al-taharruriy) as used by M. Emarah.
What about justice? The demand for justice is also a key contemporary issue. In Islam, though justice is an essential motivation behind religious belief it is not always sought after (Boisard, 1980: 142). For example, in calling for economic justice and a farmer’s revolution, Al Afghani once said: “Those farmers are naïve! Everyday they hoe the earth, but they are not ready to hoe at the hearts of the rulers who oppress them.” Similarly, Sayyid Quthb, the famous Ikhwanul Muslimin’s thinker, also emphasized Islamic justice in his masterpiece: “Al-‘Adalah Al-Ijtimaiyyah fi Al-Islam” (social justice in an Islamic perspective).
Unfortunately, liberty and justice as complimentary principles have not become important pillars for development in Muslim countries since independence. Boisard has even written that historically speaking "Islam” had always been used to support oppression and tyranny. The Muslim community always defend themselves by arguing that the reason for this problematic history is that the communities do not actually respect Islamic norms (Boisard, 1980: 150).
Sharing the “Cake” of Liberty
Currently the Indonesian Muslim community enjoys a climate of relative liberty. Having differing opinions, gathering together for dialogue and discussion, is the national reformation’s sweetest fruit. There is a consensus, at least in elite circles, that this climate of relative religious liberty should be protected from despotism and authoritarianism. Liberty and democracy should be sought so as to repair the nation and provide hope for justice.
Ironically, some Islamic groups appear to “hate” this climate of liberty and democracy, claiming that democracy is a kafir system. Yet, this relative condition of liberty and democracy, which is not experienced by many other Muslim countries, is a precondition for growth and development of civil society. Therefore, positive perceptions towards liberty and democracy should be nurtured for the sake of the nation’s benefit. It is unethical for those who do not work for liberty to take the most advantage of it.
The government should utilize this momentum for achieving justice through seeing it as one of the Pancasila principles. Much evidence indicates that liberty without justice leads to the emergence of authoritative regimes. The Arabic saying that “justice is the supreme foundation" (al-‘adl asâs al-mulk) is relevant here, as is the saying: "no state without ruler, no ruler without funds, no funds without welfare, and no welfare without justice. Wallâh Alîm!
Novriantoni, The alumnus of Al-Azhar University Egypt and student of Master program of Indonesian University Jakarta.
War and Religious Interpretation
Published: 20/4/2003
For the last several weeks, a number of Indonesian televisions have been working in partnership with Al-Jazeera television to present the progress of US and its ally’s invasion of Iraq. The theme Alharb Alal Iraq (Iraq under attack), became the most important information source on the war, and also became the most favourite program of the moment. Following on the Gulf War I in 1991, the public could observe again, through the medium of television, the horror experienced in Baghdad and other Iraq cities.
For the Arabic and Muslim world in particular, the invasion of Iraq is naturally a subject of great concern. In fact, the solidarity of the Muslim religious community has been disturbed. This does not mean to reduce the importance of Muslim solidarity with the Iraqi people’s misery but to raise the question as to what is the relation between this invasion and the religious interpretation of the invasion?
For the Arab nations, the horrors of the first Gulf War is still a recent memory. For example, Fatimah Mernissi, a feminist from Morocco, recorded her own memory of it as a trauma in her book Islam and Democracy: Fear of Modern World. There she illustrates how the war provided additional evidence for those who do not believe in the fairness of the modern world dominated by one powerful state despite modernity’s attractive cultural values. In fact, she writes that the first Gulf War reversed our perception of the uncertainty in the enchanting values of Western democracy as a lie. At the very least it provided strong evidence against the certainty of democratic values. The suspicions of the Arab and Muslim world have been confirmed.
This fear of the modern world is both appreciated and criticized by Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, the “doomed” thinker from Egypt who sees this fear as a circle, dawaairul khauf. Both Mernissi and Abu Zaid raise limited questions about the influence of the war upon religious interpretation. For example, in Al-Khitab wa Atta’wil, Abu Zaid has described the war, the defeat and the triumph from a religious point of view. In his view, the destructive effect of war has greatly influenced religious thought. Besides spreading trauma, it has also affirmed multiple dimensions of crisis for the defeated. Herein, for Zaid, the crisis of existence for Arab nations is most clearly symbolized in the Israeli defeat of the Arabs in the 1967.
In this very great condition of crisis, a return to religion (alluju’ iladdin) with particular forms of interpretation has served as a psychological fortress. The problematic effect is that even the defeat has been interpreted through a religious justification. Ironically, according to Abu Zaid’s interpretation, the Jewish triumph occurred due to their insistence of performing the injunctions of the Old Testament. While on the contrary, the Muslim community has abandoned their religious values and become trapped in the blind pursuit (Taqlid a’ma) of Western secularism which has influenced their political system and thought. Abu Zaid terms this a metaphysical interpretation of crisis and defeat (at-tafsir al-ghaibiy lil haziimah).
Several Arab thinkers have been talking about a dark and backward history evidenced in the repeated outbreak of wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1980-1990, 1991, 2003) in the region. Jabir Al-Ushfur, an Egyptian intellectual, has described this as an anxiety about moving backwards in history (Al-Ahram, 31/3/03). The Iraqi people are the first victims of this backward moving history, though not only Iraq, for Jabir warns that the whole Muslim world is becoming trapped in a backward moving circle. Rather, future oriented thinking (al-tafkiir al-mustaqbaliy), and avoiding being trapped in a crisis mode, are absolutely necessary. For Jabir, the evidence clearly shows that any progress achieved in the Arab world is repeatedly afflicted by crisis. History is going in reverse in all aspects of life including in the domain of religious thought.
In the Indonesian context, many relevant issues apply. Currently, our energy has been sapped by the horror of the US invasion of Iraq. In the religious field, an increase in radicalism seems to have become justified. Concerning the war, there has been almost no discourse of tolerance or for the urgency of upholding a religious vision which prioritizes moderation.
Using Arkoun’s terminology, the resistance logic (al-aqlun nidlaaliy) arising from this circumstance will dominate religious discourse and escalate. Yet, according to Arkoun, one of the failures of the Islamic reformation is caused by the domination of the idea of an outward notion of resistance rather than a complementary notion of an inward resistance. This outward view has according to Abu Zaid taken over since the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948 and become the dominant factor in the religious interpretation of conflict.
Those sorts of reflections seem to have some significance for our contemporary context. Of course, the purpose is not to reduce humanitarian solidarity with the suffering of the Iraqi people. Nevertheless, it is necessary, at least for me, to anticipate the mistake of becoming entrapped in the idea of history as a backward moving cycle born in the psychological crisis caused by defeat.
Novriantoni Kahar, alumnus of Al-Azhar Universitas Egypt, activist of Liberal Islam network.
For the last several weeks, a number of Indonesian televisions have been working in partnership with Al-Jazeera television to present the progress of US and its ally’s invasion of Iraq. The theme Alharb Alal Iraq (Iraq under attack), became the most important information source on the war, and also became the most favourite program of the moment. Following on the Gulf War I in 1991, the public could observe again, through the medium of television, the horror experienced in Baghdad and other Iraq cities.
For the Arabic and Muslim world in particular, the invasion of Iraq is naturally a subject of great concern. In fact, the solidarity of the Muslim religious community has been disturbed. This does not mean to reduce the importance of Muslim solidarity with the Iraqi people’s misery but to raise the question as to what is the relation between this invasion and the religious interpretation of the invasion?
For the Arab nations, the horrors of the first Gulf War is still a recent memory. For example, Fatimah Mernissi, a feminist from Morocco, recorded her own memory of it as a trauma in her book Islam and Democracy: Fear of Modern World. There she illustrates how the war provided additional evidence for those who do not believe in the fairness of the modern world dominated by one powerful state despite modernity’s attractive cultural values. In fact, she writes that the first Gulf War reversed our perception of the uncertainty in the enchanting values of Western democracy as a lie. At the very least it provided strong evidence against the certainty of democratic values. The suspicions of the Arab and Muslim world have been confirmed.
This fear of the modern world is both appreciated and criticized by Nasr Hamid Abu Zaid, the “doomed” thinker from Egypt who sees this fear as a circle, dawaairul khauf. Both Mernissi and Abu Zaid raise limited questions about the influence of the war upon religious interpretation. For example, in Al-Khitab wa Atta’wil, Abu Zaid has described the war, the defeat and the triumph from a religious point of view. In his view, the destructive effect of war has greatly influenced religious thought. Besides spreading trauma, it has also affirmed multiple dimensions of crisis for the defeated. Herein, for Zaid, the crisis of existence for Arab nations is most clearly symbolized in the Israeli defeat of the Arabs in the 1967.
In this very great condition of crisis, a return to religion (alluju’ iladdin) with particular forms of interpretation has served as a psychological fortress. The problematic effect is that even the defeat has been interpreted through a religious justification. Ironically, according to Abu Zaid’s interpretation, the Jewish triumph occurred due to their insistence of performing the injunctions of the Old Testament. While on the contrary, the Muslim community has abandoned their religious values and become trapped in the blind pursuit (Taqlid a’ma) of Western secularism which has influenced their political system and thought. Abu Zaid terms this a metaphysical interpretation of crisis and defeat (at-tafsir al-ghaibiy lil haziimah).
Several Arab thinkers have been talking about a dark and backward history evidenced in the repeated outbreak of wars (1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1980-1990, 1991, 2003) in the region. Jabir Al-Ushfur, an Egyptian intellectual, has described this as an anxiety about moving backwards in history (Al-Ahram, 31/3/03). The Iraqi people are the first victims of this backward moving history, though not only Iraq, for Jabir warns that the whole Muslim world is becoming trapped in a backward moving circle. Rather, future oriented thinking (al-tafkiir al-mustaqbaliy), and avoiding being trapped in a crisis mode, are absolutely necessary. For Jabir, the evidence clearly shows that any progress achieved in the Arab world is repeatedly afflicted by crisis. History is going in reverse in all aspects of life including in the domain of religious thought.
In the Indonesian context, many relevant issues apply. Currently, our energy has been sapped by the horror of the US invasion of Iraq. In the religious field, an increase in radicalism seems to have become justified. Concerning the war, there has been almost no discourse of tolerance or for the urgency of upholding a religious vision which prioritizes moderation.
Using Arkoun’s terminology, the resistance logic (al-aqlun nidlaaliy) arising from this circumstance will dominate religious discourse and escalate. Yet, according to Arkoun, one of the failures of the Islamic reformation is caused by the domination of the idea of an outward notion of resistance rather than a complementary notion of an inward resistance. This outward view has according to Abu Zaid taken over since the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1948 and become the dominant factor in the religious interpretation of conflict.
Those sorts of reflections seem to have some significance for our contemporary context. Of course, the purpose is not to reduce humanitarian solidarity with the suffering of the Iraqi people. Nevertheless, it is necessary, at least for me, to anticipate the mistake of becoming entrapped in the idea of history as a backward moving cycle born in the psychological crisis caused by defeat.
Novriantoni Kahar, alumnus of Al-Azhar Universitas Egypt, activist of Liberal Islam network.
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